The papers by Boehm and Spitze provide connot only provide increased supply assurance, but trasts in approach, content, and conclusions. The also raise the price ceilings, the latitude for price Spitze paper reflects the issues as seen through instability would also increase. In addition, rethe eyes of an observant professor located in a search suggests that within the current relationmajor Corn Belt university. Its ideas reflect senship of support, release, and call prices, market sitivity to articulation of policy problems conprices tend to center on or be attracted toward fronting producers in the region. Boehm's paper the loan rate, the release price, or the call price, is particularly strong in that it reflects the daydepending on the grain supply-demand balance to-day sensitivity to the contemporary economic (Gardner and Just) . That is, with large stocks in and political forces that currently affect the polthe reserve, the market price rests near the loan icy process. Both papers lack a clear sensitivity rate. As stocks decrease, at some point the marto the policy position and problems of southern ket price is attracted off the loan and moves agriculture, rapidly to near the release level. With a sufficient This discussion is divided into two parts, major drawdown of stocks, price moves off the release points of needed refinement, and a perspective to near the call level. on the issues as they relate to southern agriculIf the differential between the loan rate and the ture.
release price were widened, one could anticipate that a large quantity of grain in the reserve would result in market prices that would approximate POINTS OF REFINEMENT the loan level. That is, the wider the difference between the loan rate and the release price, the Four major points of refinement exist with remore resistance one would expect to the market spect to the two papers. price moving off the loan level. There has not yet been enough experience with the farmer-held reUncertainty serve to demonstrate the validity of this hypothesis. Both papers contain considerable discussion Despite extensive discussion of the uncerof the impact that increased uncertainty has had tainty issue, neither paper recognizes the role of upon agriculture. The major policy tool for regovernment in contributing to uncertainty ducing price and supply uncertainty is the (Schultz). Government decisions to impose emfarmer-held reserve program.
bargoes and price controls have had a major deBoehm spends considerable time discussing stabilizing effect upon agricultural prices. Many the virtues of this program. While the usefulness other program detail decisions, such as not reof the reserve as a policy tool has been amply leasing grain from the reserve when required by demonstrated, some problems are apparent.
published rules or reversing a marketing order Substantial conflicts exist between the three policy, have substantial destabilizing effects. major reserve objectives of price stability, supply Spitze suggests that one alternative to such acavailability, and price support. Although productions might be to place limits in the 1981 farm bill ers have been attracted into the reserve by the on embargoes and the size of the grain reserve. combination of relatively low market prices, Reality suggests that, regardless of the limits interest and storage subsidies, they are becoming placed on policy-makers, decisions to change the increasingly disenchanted with the price ceilings manner in which policy is implemented are freset by the reserve release and call prices-the quently dictated either by domestic or internareserve could be "sold out," thus jeopardizing tional political conditions. Laws never appear to both its price stability and supply assurance obbe sufficiently tight to prevent government from jectives. This is particularly true of the feedgrain taking action under such conditions. For examreserves for which the release price is 125 perpie, strong incentives exist to accumulate recent of the loan rate, and the call price is 140 serves when surpluses exist. Block's more producer-oriented philosophy. of influence in the world was involved).
This alignment, when combined with leadership Over time, I am increasingly coming to subchanges in the House, could shift the balance of scribe to a theory picked up from Don Paarlberg.
influence in food and agricultural policy formulaIt suggests that if a policy tool is available for tion to the Senate. government to use, the clear incentive is for it to It would be dangerous to take the producerbe used whether needed or not. To illustrate, the oriented philosophy espoused by Secretary Packers and Stockyards Administration conBlock too seriously in a policy decision context. tinued to regulate rates for stockyard services far During the past decade, several of the significant beyond the date required by changing competiagricultural policy decisions have not been made tive conditions. Set-asides were used in the 1970s by the secretary of agriculture. Examples include without clear justification, and certainly without the signing of the long-term trade agreement with effectiveness in controlling production and raisthe Soviet Union, the imposition of export eming prices.
bargos, and the decision to freeze food prices. An extension of this theory of government Many less significant agriculture secretary recinvolvement might suggest that as agriculture ommendations have been reversed upon reachmoves into a new era of both a tighter food and ing the executive office of the president for apfiber supply-demand balance and a shifting of the proval. At the same time, the secretary has on balance of political power away from farmers, occasions in the past decade had a major impact policies and programs enacted to protect farmers on policy direction. Effective implementation of might be used against them. For example, in the a trade-oriented philosophy by Secretary Butz early 1970s, Secretary Butz restricted the rice and the establishment of the farmer-held grain allotment in a manner that eventually resulted in reserve by the Bergland-Hjort team are examrice producers being forced to give up the proples. gram. A similar strategy is currently being em-
The point is that the effectiveness of the secreployed with respect to the peanut program. Both tary of agriculture in implementing programs that the federal milk order and milk price support farmers view as being in their interest is to a large programs have the potential for being used extent determined by power relationships within against dairy farmers in the 1980s.
the cabinet and the executive office of the president. Secretary Block set the stage for the lifting New Leadership of the grain embargo as being an early test of this power relationship. The change in leadership within USDA and in Crisis Theory the Congress has significant implications for both the 1981 farm bill and related policy decisions.
Boehm's crisis theory is not only interesting, It should not necessarily be assumed that the but also useful to keep in mind for policy renew Republican policy team signals a complete searchers and educators. However, question return to a Butz-era farm policy philosophy.
may be raised about whether there really is a Both Boehm and Spitze correctly sense the diffilong-term trend toward crisis policies in agriculculty of predicting the future of Reagan-Block ture. farm policy initiatives. Secretary Butz, like OMB There have been periods in which economic Director Stockman, was driven by the ideologiconditions in agriculture have been sufficiently cal philosophy of allowing domestic and internaunstable that farm policy was continuously on tional market forces to operate. His implicit, if the agenda of the Congress. Such periods might not explicit, goal of dismantling ASCS reflects include the settlement and technology decade of this philosophy. It contrasts with Secretary the 1860s, the depression decade of the 1930s, Block's defense of the tobacco, peanut, and price and the post-war attempts to get control of farm support program. Block has expressed prices and overproduction (Benedict) . philosophical opposition to target prices. This An interesting related point is Boehm's conopposition appears to stem primarily from the clusion that despite the legislative turmoil that dislike of the welfare image associated with defihas existed in the late 1970s, farmers as a whole ciency payments held by many farmers.
were really not that bad off. This could reflect the Target prices were supported by Butz with the increased structural segmentation that exists political realization that without target prices; within agriculture (USDA). Macroagricultural pressure would exist to raise support prices to a income levels and averages are increasingly less level where our competitive position in the exuseful in evaluating the degree of unrest within port market would be jeopardized. Interestingly, agriculture. Such numbers are heavily influenced by the relative overall prosperity both of the cial, and political organization of southern aglarge farms and the part-time farms.
riculture must be considered also. A special interest group of unrest is developing within agriculture. This interest group could be Economic Differences characterized as the middle-size younger farmer who rents most of his land and has a severe cash Over time, northern and southern agriculture flow problem competing at current prices. These have become increasingly interdependent. This farmers find themselves in competition with large has occurred as the production of corn, sorghum, owner-operators, who have lower nominal costs, soybeans, wheat, and milk has increased in the as well as with part-time operators, who have South. Thus, while significant southern policy isless concern for relative costs because they are sues relating to tobacco, peanuts, sugar, rice, not primarily dependent on their farm operation and cotton still exist, southern farmers have befor their income.
come increasingly interested in policy decisions relating to feedgrains, soybeans, wheat, and Research and Education milk. While Midwest farmers traditionally have been Spitze rightfully raises the research and educaskeptical of southern control of the agriculture tion organization and funding issue to a level of committees, southern farmers have become invisibility. Agricultural economists have been creasingly concerned that feedgrain, wheat, soyguilty of not recognizing earlier the significance bean, and dairy policy has a "Corn Belt bias." of Title XIV of the Food and Agricultural Act of Such a bias exists not only because the bulk of 1977. This act set up an ill-conceived and poorly these products has traditionally been produced in implemented system of federal planning for agthe North, but also because agriculture secrericultural research, teaching, and extension, now taries, and the top USDA appointees typically known as the Joint Council (Castle) .
have come from the North. In other words, the The ability of this legislation to get through the South has had, and continues to have, an agriculCongress virtually without notice vividly illustural policy influence and leadership problem trates (1) The lack of political organization, musprimarily with respect to northern crops. This cle, and awareness of the food and agricultural conflict can be expected to continue. research system. (2) The willingness of the sysSouthern agriculture is also characterized by tem to horse trade the potential for more federal significant structural differences. Production in support dollars for a system of federal planning.
the South tends to be more highly concentrated. (3) The lack of willingness and/or ability to Land holdings, cattle feeding, and dairy entermobilize the agricultural establishment and chalprises tend to have a larger proportion of the lenge Washington power brokers who do not unproduction concentrated on the largest farms. At derstand or appreciate the virtues of the decenthe same time, a greater dichotomy of size exists tralized food and agricultural research system of in southern agriculture between the large and the which we are a part (Knutson, Paarlberg, and small farm. That is, while a larger proportion of McCalla).
the production is concentrated on very large Without a politically potent organization, southern farms, there is also a larger number of USDA research and extension functions run a small farms (USDA, p. 75). great risk of taking a disproportionate share of The result of this dichotomy is a greater conany budget-cutting effort. This is likely when centration of farm program benefits in the hands there is a lack of land-grant-oriented individuals of the largest farmers in the South (USDA, at top levels within USDA.
p. 103). Policies to effectively allocate a larger proportion of farm program benefits to smaller producers would have greater impact upon the IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHERN South. AGRICULTURE Resource problems are of greater importance in the South. Weather extremes in terms of rainSouthern agriculture has many of the same fall/and heat are greater during the growing seaproblems as northern agriculture: both are conson. Continuation of the disaster program is of fronted by problems of price and income instabilgreater interest to the South than it is to the ity, unprecedented inflation, and a disadvantaged North. producer market position.
The availability of water for irrigation has beThe differences between southern and northcome a major issue in several areas of the South. ern agriculture have both an economic and a Serious question exists with regard to the public philosophical-sociological-political basis (Knutwillingness to invest money in irrigation projects son). The importance of these differences in indesigned to sustain agricultural production in terpreting policy implications cannot be overseveral areas of the South and West. A Reagan looked: that is, what counts is not just the crops administration should be more sensitive to this or livestock that are grown. The economic, soneed than the Carter administration.
While substantial southern land areas still are Stated more crudely, the political bosses are being developed for agricultural production, the stronger in southern agriculture. migration of people to the Sun Belt is creating With this background, I am not as pessimistic increased competition for both water and land about the future of the southern commodity proresources. Substantial competition will continue grams in the 1981 farm bill as Boehm. The South to develop between use of southern lands for agis in control of both agriculture committees. Secricultural and forestry purposes.
retary Block is already in a position of defending It is obvious that resource policy is more imthese programs-at least partially to gain support portant to the South than it is to the North.
of the committee leadership. In the end, political pragmatism could even concede and recommend that the president sign a farm bill that retains Philosophical-Sociological and Political peanut allotments, the tobacco program, and 75 Differences percent of parity dairy price supports. Yet I agree that these programs will need to Political power is more highly concentrated in adjust as economic forces affecting agriculture the South than in the North. Large-scale southadjust. For example, I have argued that peanut ern farmers traditionally have been in a position producers might be better off striking a deal in of power both within their farm organizations the 1981 farm bill for a relatively high target price and political parties. The traditional power broand pursue development of the export market as ker role of these producers, combined with the rice farmers have done. Unfortunately, there higher risk of southern agriculture, have given may not be a target price program to compromise southern crop-producing leadership a more libover. Likewise, as Spitze implies, the sugarcane eral outlook on the role of government in agriculproducers have to recognize that competition ture. However, this liberalism does not extend to from corn sweeteners substantially changes the support for the food-stamp-related income rediseconomics of import controls as a means of raistribution programs.
ing their returns while retaining their market. Nevertheless, a clear distinction must be made Such changes are in and of themselves bitter between the crop producer and the livestock pills for the southern crop farmer to swallow. producer. Southern cattlemen are notoriously
The reality that he is increasingly unable to conanti-government-except when it comes to istrol his economic destiny through political means sues such as beef imports. Yet southern political is becoming apparent in a larger number of situaleaders of both crop and livestock producers tions. Some day even the tobacco farmer may be enjoy a substantial following of their producers.
forced to recognize this reality.
